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CRIMINAL LAW
FOREWORD-DOCTRINAL DOLDRUMS: THE SUPREME COURT
1976 TERM CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS
B. J. GEORGE, JR.*
Particularly in the law affecting criminal in-
vestigations, the present Supreme Court has
moved steadily away from the approach of the
Warren Court, which looked at the functioning
of the criminal justice system rather than at the
impact of that system on individual defend-
ants.' To some that is a highly desirable return
to a sound constitutional approach, 2 while to
others a serious threat to fundamental rights
of criminal defendants has occurred or is in
the process of occurring.3 The Burger Court
cannot fairly be said to be oblivious to the
claims of citizens to fundamental fairness; its
decisions delineating new rights for prisoners
4
and mentally-ill persons5 establish a contrary
premise. Nevertheless, several decisions of the
Court's Term under consideration suggest
enough of the Justices are wavering between
* President, Southwestern Legal Foundation.
Cardinal examples of the systems approach are
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (regulating
interrogation) and the paired decisions of Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (governing eyewitness
identification procedures). Schneckoth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), well illustrates the current
Court's approach, rejecting as it does a warning of
rights as a condition precedent to waiver of fourth
amendment rights in the form of a consent to search.2E.g., Skinner, Foreword-A New Balance, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 365 (1977).
3 E.g., Hartman, Foreword- The Burger Court- 1973
Term: Leaving the Sixties Behind Us, 65 J. CRIM. L. &
C. 437 (1975).
4 E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(censorship of mail and access to counsel); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (disciplinary proceed-
ings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (pro-
bation and parole revocation).
5 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
(Civil Rights Act liability for improper detention as
patient when outpatient treatment was available);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (regulation
of procedures for commitment of procedurally in-
competent defendants); see generally George, Emerg-
ing Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, 27 NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEFENSE 35 (1976).
adherence to a concern for individual protec-
tions under the Constitution and reduction of
the staggering burden on federal courts posed
by state convicts through eliminating or re-
stricting doctrines and remedies, that clear de-
velopment of controlling federal principles has
been set back. A consequence has been a state
of doctrinal doldrums responsible for certain
rulings difficult to reconcile with other recent
holdings. Nevertheless, one can only assume
that a functional majority of the Court is com-
mitted to standards of constitutional construc-
tion, many of which would have been abhor-
rent to a majority of the Warren Court.
I
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
A. Search and Seizure
In its 1975 Term, the Court stringently lim-
ited the application of fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination to seizure or
production of documents,6 choosing to rely
instead on the fourth amendment. That has
not brought about relaxation of fourth amend-
ment requirements, however, as illustrated by
G. M. Leasing Corporation v. United States.7 IRS
agents made a warrantless entry into a tax-
payer's combined office and residential prem-
ises and seized records and evidence there."
The taxpayer thereafter sued the government
for damages and other relief, but was met by
6 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See also
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (availa-
bility of tax return information to support prosecu-
tion).
7 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
8 The agents also seized certain vehicles of the
taxpayer from the street, parking lots and other
places accessible to the public. The Court ruled that
no protected right of privacy had been invaded by
those seizures.
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the contention that the Constitution9 allows
seizure of taxpayer property to meet tax defi-
ciencies, as a particular application of the
Court's administrative search doctrine.' 0
The Court disagreed with the government's
position. No advance judicial authorization is
required before property can be distrained to
meet tax obligations," but that does not extend
to searches to discover such property. Nor does
liability for taxes convert otherwise protected
premises into business premises subject to ad-
ministrative inspection. Some form of regu-
lated business is required under Biswell. In the
absence of exigent circumstances posing dan-
ger of loss or destruction of property subject to
seizure, tax authorities must comply with stan-
dard search warrant requirements before they
can seize taxpayer property within an area of
protected privacy
2
The Court's decisions allowing warrantless
searches of arrested persons upon arrest13 and
after booking,'14 and of vehicles under analo-
gous circumstances"s had seemed to signal the
eventual repudiation of the Court's holding in
Chimel v. California 16 that the warrants clause of
the fourth amendment is paramount, thus for-
bidding warrantless searches in other than exi-
gent circumstances. However, that a majority
of the Court is not yet ready to return to the
I Reliance was placed on U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, setting forth the right to lay and collect taxes.
10 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
' A related principle had been established in in-
stances of seizure of property for forfeiture as contra-
band. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
12 The issue of whether the IRS agents could
defend against individual liability asserted under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on the basis of good
faith reliance on apparently valid IRS procedures,
was left for the trial court on remand.
13 Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
14 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974);
cf. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (recovery of
"highly evanescent evidence" from under petitioner's
fingernails, well before arrest and without consent,
reasonable under fourth amendment standards).
15 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(search of impounded vehicle); Texas v. White, 423
U.S. 67 (1975) (deferred search of vehicle impounded
at scene of crime); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433 (1973) (search of unattended, wrecked vehicle
for police weapon believed to be there held reasona-
ble as in exercise of police community caretaking
functions).
1c 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
pre-Chimel, Rabinowitz doctrine 7 is made most
clear in Chadwick."' Information from railway
employees and the reactions of dogs trained to
detect controlled substances led federal author-
ities to believe that defendant's locked foot-
locker, seized from the open trunk of his car
to which it had been removed from a baggage
room, contained marijuana. A key to the foot-
locker was seized from a defendant at time of
arrest, but search was not conducted for well
over an hour following arrest. The government
claimed that no protected right of privacy ex-
isted if homes, offices or private conversations
were unaffected by search and seizure, that
the search could be taken as incident to arrest
if liberally construed, and that the vehicle
search doctrine covered the case because the
footlocker was seized from the trunk of a car
which in turn was mobile.
The Supreme Court, by a substantial major-
ity, '9 rejected all three propositions. The right
of privacy under the fourth amendment is not
restricted. It extends to any unreasonable gov-
ernment infringement upon a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy. Hence, personal property
like the defendant's locked footlocker was
clearly within the protection of the fourth
amendment. Personal possessions of that sort,
even though movable, are the subject of a
much greater legitimate expectation of privacy
than vehicles. Defendant's footlocker in the
secure control of federal authorities in a federal
building posed no threat of loss or destruction
constituting exigent circumstances. That con-
clusion is not affected by the fact that the
container had earlier been placed in a vehicle.
Finally, although the footlocker might have
been legitimately searched incident to a valid
arrest, that justification could not continue be-
yond the time and circumstances during which
an arrestee could gain access to a weapon or
destroy evidence. Under such circumstances
Preston20 was the controlling analogy.
'7 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
18 United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
19 Only Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dis-
sented. They believed no warrant should be required
to search and seize movable property in the posses-
sion of a person lawfully arrested in a public place.
97 S. Ct. at 2486 (Blackmun, Rehnquist, J.J., dissent-
ing).
0 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)
(search of defendant's car at a police station after
impoundment for defendant's convenience after ar-
rest for minor offense not involving use of vehicle).
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If exigency is present, even tlough on a
somewhat abstract basis, then warrantless
search is permissible. In United States v. Ram-
sey, 21 a federal postal inspector suspected that
several bulky first-class envelopes from com-
mon sources to the same addresses might con-
tain a controlled substance. Inspection revealed
white powder in one which on the basis of a
standard field test was heroin. Heroin was then
found in the other envelopes. On the basis of a
search warrant, the envelopes once more were
opened at the post office of delivery and most
of the contents removed. After delivery the
recipients were kept under surveillance and
Ramsey arrested when the envelopes were de-
livered to him. Ramsey obtained a reversal of
his conviction because the court of appeals
found the original inspection to have been in
violation of the first and fourth amendments,
thus tainting everything that followed.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The federal
legislative standard of reasonable cause to sus-
pect the presence of contraband in the mail,
invoked in this case because the shipment was
international and not domestic, is compatible
with the fourth amendment, which recognizes
a special norm for border searches and inspec-
tions.22 The federal employee who initiated the
inspection had a reasonable basis for suspicion
and therefore acted properly. Further, there
was no unwarranted chill on the exercise of
first amendment rights which may have fol-
lowed from the possibility that first-class mail
might be inspected. Federal regulations23 pro-
hibit perusal of correspondence in sealed inter-
national first-class mail without an authorizing
search warrant. This constitutes a sufficient
control over abuses, and renders a chill "not
only 'minimal,'. . . but also wholly subjective." 2'
Given the Court's continuing concern for
retaining search warrants as the norm and
warrantless searches as the exception, it is not
surprising that the Court outlawed a system
under which lay magistrates received fees for
issuing search warrants but not for refusing
them.u This ran counter to the constitutional
requirement that officials issuing warrants be
21 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
22 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976) (border inspection of vehicles).
23 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1977).
24 United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. at 1983
(citations omitted).
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
"neutral and detached. '26 Neutrality and de-
tachment are unimpaired by receipt of hearsay
evidence, 7 but the same evidence cannot be
used to help establish the prosecution's case at
trial.
28
Former President Nixon's efforts to obtain
return of his presidential papers were based,
in part, on a contention that federal legislation
which authorized the General Services Admin-
istrator to take custody of those papers was
invalid under the fourth amendment as a gen-
eral warrant. The Court found no unreasona-
bleness in legislation which was aimed at papers
that had had public exposure. The Court au-
thorized retention only of documents which
were of historical significance and those re-
quired for judicial proceedings. Administrative
screening was the functional equivalent of ju-
dicial controls in more orthodox seizure situa-
tions .29
B. Data Compilations
Detection of certain regulatory offenses can
be facilitated through maintenance of data
banks. The Court had already interpreted the
federal bank secrecy act30 as designed to aid
law enforcement rather than to preserve the
privacy of bank depositors and customers.
3'
Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the
Court sustained the validity of a state controlled
substance statute which provided for a central
computerized data bank of names and ad-
dresses of those who obtained controlled sub-
stances through medical prescription.3 2 The
Court, however, left ajar a suitable door to
scrutinize inadequate security precautions
which permit unofficial use of computerized
data.-"
26 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971); see also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S.
345 (1972) (clerk of municipal court could issue arrest
warrants based on municipal ordinance violations,
being independent of law enforcement agencies).
2" Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and see
the plurality opinion in United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573 (1971).
28 Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20 (1976).
29 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 97
S. Ct. 2777 (1977).
30 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1970).
31 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
32 Whalen v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977).
a The collection of taxes, the distribution of
welfare and social security benefits, the super-
vision of public health, the direction of our
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C. Electronic Surveillance
The Court has never directly passed on the
constitutionality of federal eavesdropping leg-
islation 34 under the standards established in
Katz.3" Nevertheless, the Court has construed
statutory language in a number of cases since
1971 .3 6 Despite the fact that each case offered
opportunity to strike down some or all of the
statutory provisions on constitutional grounds,
the Court has contented itself with construing
language so as to avoid constitutional difficul-
ties and in applying the statutory exclusionary
rule37 only to enforce aspects of the statute
viewed to be indispensable to its effective oper-
ation. (One may assume that the Warren Court
approach would have been precisely the oppo-
site; given that if any part of the legislation
were valid, all but trivial departures from stat-
utory requirements would have been sanc-
tioned through invocation of a statute-based
exclusionary rule.) The Burger Court ap-
proach has been strongly confirmed in the
Court's Donovan ruling.
38
In Donovan, federal authorities obtained an
eavesdropping order against certain named
suspects, but in an application for an extension
order they did not name Donovan and others
though the authorities had probable cause to
believe Donovan would use the telephone lines.
The names of some of the individuals whose
armed forces and the enforcement of the
criminal laws, all require the orderly preser-
vation of great quantities of information,
much of which is personal in character and
potentially embarrassing or fiarmful if dis-
closed. The right to collect and use such data
for public purposes is typically accompanied
by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty
to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing
that in some circumstances that duty arguably
his [sic] its roots in the Constitution, neverthe-
less New York's statutory scheme, and its im-
plementing administrative procedures, evi-
dence a proper concern with, and protection
of, the individual's interest in privacy.
Id. at 879-80.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520 (1970).
3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36 United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974);
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974);
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972).
37 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (1970). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515.
1s United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
conversations were intercepted also were omit-
ted from information supplied to the issuing
district court preliminary to issuance of inven-
tory notices.39 Lower federal courts found the
government's activities in violation of the legis-
lation as they affected the individuals not
named and ordered all eavesdropping-derived
evidence against them suppressed. The Su-
preme Court reversed.
The Court rejected the prosecution's conten-
tion that before persons need be listed in an
application for an original or extension order
they must be subscribers to or operators of the
transmission media to be monitored. The
Court noted that "a wiretap application must
name an individual if the Government has
probable cause to believe that the individual is
engaged in the criminal activity under investi-
gation and expects to intercept the individual's
conversations over the target telephone.140 In
addition, a district court should know the
names of those whose conversations have been
intercepted whether or not they are likely to be
indicted (a distinction urged by the govern-
ment), since otherwise it cannot properly exer-
cise its discretion whether or not to notify such
persons "in the interest of justice 41 about the
fact of interception. In sum, the legislation
should be given a liberal construction in order
to avoid constitutional concerns, 42 an attitude
clearly manifested in the lower court decisions
in the Donovan matter.
A more slender majority of the Court,
43
however, disagreed with the premise that
eavesdropping evidence must routinely be ex-
cluded if applicant officials have failed to com-
ply with the statutory system. Reaffirming its
position in Giordano, that suppression of evi-
dence is required only for "those statutory
requirements that directly and substantially im-
plement the congressional intention to limit
39 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
40 United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 428.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
42 The Court cites preenactment materials suggest-
ing statutory coverage to forestall difficulties under
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 429 U.S. at
426-27.
" Only Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the
interpretation of the statute on the identification
issue. 429 U.S. at 440. However, three Justices dis-
sented on the exclusionary rule aspect of the opinion.
429 U.S. at 445 (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, J.J.,
dissenting).
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the use of intercept procedures to those situa-
tions clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary device" (the exclusionary rule),"4
it found no such weight in the statutory provi-
sions involved in Donovan. Therefore, the evi-
dence should not have been suppressed.
If the matters dealt with in Donovan are of
insufficient importance to justify application of
a statutory exclusionary rule, it is difficult to
see what provisions would be necessary in this
statute, which has been invoked and construed
for almost a decade. It appears likely, there-
fore, that the federal statute will be interpreted
by the Court on selected narrow points, but
that didactic effect will be achieved through
the Court's discussion of doctrine, not the in-
vocation of an exclusionary remedy to benefit
defendants who have advanced such points of
law for resolution.
D. Undercover Surveillance
Interesting implications about the propriety
of the use of undercover agents are to be
gleaned from Weatherford v. Bursey.4 An under-
cover officer, Weatherford, sat in on confer-
ences between Bursey (charged with vandaliz-
ing a selective service office) and counsel, prin-
cipally to preserve his assumed identity. Al-
though various matters of defense strategy and
tactics were discussed, the trial court finding
that Weatherford communicated nothing to
law enforcement superiors or the prosecution
about the contents of the discussions remained
undisturbed. Weatherford appeared at trial,
however, as a witness to the clandestine crimi-
nal activities of which Bursey was convicted.
Bursey later sued under the federal civil rights
act46 for damages, claiming an unconstitutional
infringement upon the right to counsel. A
federal court of appeals laid down a per se
exclusionary rule allowing recovery if the pros-
ecution knowingly allows intrusion into an at-
torney-client relationship. The Supreme Court
reversed.
The opinion first distinguishes two decisions
by the Warren Court4 7 which had reversed
convictions because of eavesdropping upon
prisoners and counsel during preparation for
4United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527
(1974).
45 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
41142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
47 O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967);
Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
trial. The Court noted that at most" these
cases stood for the principle that actual use of
evidence obtained from monitored conversa-
tions between defendants and attorneys could
violate the sixth amendment. Nothing in them
stood for an automatic liability or retrial rule.
49
Nor was the Court persuaded that the possibil-
ity a participant in such conversations might be
an undercover law enforcement agent exerts a
chilling effect on the attorney-client relation-
ship in the way that monitored conversations
might.50 The Court had already recognized
"the unfortunate necessity of undercover work
and the value it often is to effective law enforce-
ment." 51 Lacking "general oversight authority
with respect to state police investigations," the
Court could "disapprove an investigatory prac-
tice only if it violates the Constitution,"-2 a
premise ignored by the court of appeals' per se
exclusionary rule.
3
" The Solicitor General had confessed error in
both cases, precluding the necessity for a judicial
inquiry into whether evidence thus derived actually
was used. 429 U.S. at 551.
49 It is not clear whether the rule below was one of
absolute liability under § 1983 or a rule of automatic
reversal of convictions obtained after infringement
upon private attorney-client consultations. The latter
of course would not be directly germane to civil
rights litigation, and would not be particularly effec-
tive unless converted into a form of immunity against
prosecution at any time. Obviously, no such exclu-
sionary doctrine arises based on improper arrest and
detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 109 (1975).
The only analogy for such an approach seems to be
the Court's due process reanalysis of the entrapment
doctrine. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484
(1976); see George, United States Supreme Court Term
1975-76: Criminal Law Decisions, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1,
5-6 (1977).
50 The Court found nothing in Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 29a (1966), to support the contention
"that the chill is the same whether induced by elec-
tronic survillance or by undercover agents." Weath-
erford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. at 554 n.4.
51 Weatherford v. Bursey 429 U.S. at 557. "We
have also recognized the desirability and legality of
continued secrecy even after arrest." Id.
52 Id.
" The Court also disapproved a lower court appli-
cation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to
require disclosure of the undercover agent's identity
before trial. Noting the want of a general constitu-
tional right to discovery, it found no due process
rule requiring disclosure before trial of the names of
witnesses who might testify unfavorably to the de-
fense. This was not altered by the fact that the
prosecution at first indicated that Weatherford would
not testify at trial and then changed its mind. Nor
1977] FOREWORD
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Weatherford can of course be read fairly nar-
rowly if one chooses. Nevertheless, the entire
tone of the opinion is consistent with the
Court's reversion to ad hoc invocations of due
process, looking to denial of fundamental fair-
ness in specific cases54 rather than to defects in
the operation of the entire criminal justice
system. Accordingly, even in the instance of as
fundamental a right as the right to counsel,"
the burden rests on the criminal defendant (or
the plaintiff in a civil rights action) to show an
actual impairment of the working relationship
between client and counsel.46 Certainly no new
exclusionary rules, whether of evidence or
otherwise, will be endorsed by a majority of
the Court as now constituted.
E. Interrogation
The Court has been engaged for the past
three terms in curtailing the scope of Miranda"7
without directly overruling it. An illustration
of the process is found in Oregon v. Mathiason,'s
in which a parolee responded to a police re-
quest for an interview and, without Miranda
warnings and waiver, incriminated himself. He
was not arrested until some time later. State
appellate courts found the equivalent to Mi-
randa custody in that Mathiason was under the
focus of suspicion and was being questioned in
a police facility. The Supreme Court disagreed:
did the fact that defendant might have decided to
plead guilty rather than stand trial had he known
about Weatherford's role as an undercover agent
add an important dimension. There is no constitu-
tional right to plea bargain, and hence no constitu-
tional infringement of defendant rights if the prose-
cution decides to go to trial rather than engage in
plea bargaining.
'4"Due process" emphasizes fairness between the
State and the individual dealing with the State, re-
gardless of how other individuals in the same situa-
tion may be treated. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
609 (1974).
" See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975), discussed in Allen, Foreword-Quiescence and
Ferment: The 1974 Term in the Supreme Court, 66 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 391, 391-93 (1976).
56 The Court suggests that O'Brien and Black,
against the background of Hoffa, may have been
fourth amendment cases because of the use of unlaw-
ful eavesdropping devices. Weatherford v. Bursey,
429 U.S. at 552. Cf. Justice Marshall's dissent, id. at
567 n.6.
5" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted
into one in which Miranda applies simply be-
cause a reviewing court concludes that, even in
the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement the questioning took
place in a "coercive environment." Any inter-
view of one suspected of a crime by a police
officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by
virtue of the fact that the police officer is part
of a law enforcement system which may ulti-
mately cause the suspect to be charged with a
crime. But police officers are not required to
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question. Nor is the requirement of warn-
ings to be imposed simply because the ques-
tioned person is one whom the police suspect.
Miranda warnings are required only where
there has been such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him "in custody." It was
that sort of coercive environment to which Mi-
randa by its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited.'
9
Such an approach had been signaled in the
preceding term when the Court voided a focus
test in the setting of IRS intelligence division
interviews .60 This clearly indicates that Miranda
concepts will be quite literally interpreted.
Nor will the constitutional voluntariness doc-
trine be given a mechanical interpretation. In
Hutto v. Ross,6 1 a state defendant contended
that his confession, made in the presence of
defense counsel after Miranda warnings, was
involuntary because it had been brought about
by a guilty plea, later withdrawn. The Court
rejected the contention. Noting that the plea
bargain was not conditioned on a confession, it
found no basis for a "but for" causation chain
which would render the confession the product
of plea negotiations for purposes of the volun-
tariness test. Either direct or implied promises,
or coercion, would have to be established in
order to trigger a constitutional exclusionary
rule .
62
Limiting interpretations of Miranda and
other constitutional doctrines affecting admis-
sibility of confessions of course serve to reduce
the number of state prisoner claims, or at least
59 Id. at 495.
60 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
61 429 U.S. 28 (1976).
62 In the reverse context, the Court had held that
an otherwise voluntary guilty plea could not be at-
tacked because of an earlier confession arguably
obtained in violation of Miranda requirements. Par-
ker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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reduce the number of those in which relief will
be given. A more direct way of accomplishing
the aim of restricting habeas corpus dockets of
federal district courts is to require that state
defendants take advantage of available state
remedies or else be foreclosed from raising
constitutional issues. The Court had done this
during its 1975 Term by instructing federal
courts to withhold exercise of their habeas
corpus jurisdictional powers concerning fourth
amendment claims if state convicts had been
afforded a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate
such matters in state courts but failed to do so,
for whatever reason.6 During the same Term
the Court also applied a similar contempora-
neous objection requirement to other claims of
procedural irregularity. 64 In Wainwright v.
Sykes, 5 the Court applied Francis standards to
govern Miranda matters and presumably any
other doctrines affecting admissibility of
confessions. Particularly if Sykes is given retro-
active effect as Powell has been,66 the result
should be an immediate further reduction of
the number of state prisoner habeas petitions
in federal courts.
6 7
6 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); see also
George, supra note 49, at 17-19.
64 Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). The
Court had also ruled that federal habeas relief is
unavailable to a state prisoner who failed to utilize
available state appellate remedies. Murch v. Mot-
tram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972).
1 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
6 Based on Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 495 n.38.
See, e.g., Jordan v. Estelle, 551 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.
1977); Hines v. Augur, 550 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1977);
Kahn v. Flood, 550 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292 (7th
Cir. 1976). Retroactivity also precludes a federal
prisoner from using a § 2255 motion to attack, on
fourth amendment grounds, a state conviction used
to enhance a later federal sentence. United States v.
Tisnado, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976).
Sykes does not address specifically the retroactivity
issue, but the tenor of the opinion, which suggests
that the principle of exhaustion of remedies has
been long established, lays a doctrinal basis for a
holding of retroactivity.
67 Because of its use of Francis principles the Court
found it unnecessary to pursue an interesting doc-
trinal issue, namely, whether the reinterpretation of
Miranda requirements, as distinguished from con-
cerns as to voluntariness, as "prophylactic rules"
developed to protect fifth amendment rights, Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974), renders "a
bare allegation of a Miranda violation, without accom-
panying assertions going to the actual voluntariness
or reliability of the confession" a nonconstitutional
Thus, in three of its four confessions-related
decisions during the 1976 Term the Court
moved in the direction of restricting either
doctrine or federal remedy. The fourth, Brewer
v. Williams, 8 is more troublesome. Examined
closely, it does nothing more than revivify the
Court's earlier Massiah69 holding, that formally
charged defendants cannot be directly or indi-
rectly interrogated by law enforcement officials
in the absence of retained or appointed coun-
sel. Indeed, the majority opinion eschews any
consideration of either Miranda or the volun-
tariness doctrine.70 Nevertheless, in a dichot-
omy somewhat reminiscent of that encountered
in the eyewitness identification field, 71 the
Court distinguishes interrogation transactions
before formal charges have been laid and (or?)
counsel retained or priovided from those in
which one or both of those events have oc-
curred. As the Court noted: "[O]nce adversary
proceedings have commenced against an indi-
vidual, he has a right to legal representation
when the government interrogates him."
72
Williams may prove to have fairly limited
impact on the law of interrogation. For one
thing, the Court recognizes that the sixth
amendment right to counsel can be waived for
purposes of interrogation. Williams was not
shown by the state to have knowingly and
voluntarily waived the right to counsel, but
waiver may be easier to establish in more*rou-
tine cases. 73 It also remains to be seen whether
actual representation by counsel is important,
issue inappropriate to be submitted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 224 1(c)(3) (1970). Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. at
2506 n.11. On the conceptual matter, see, e.g.
George, Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 69 MIL. L. REv. 1, 17-18, 20-21 (1975).
68 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
6' Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
70 Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. at 1239. However,
Justice Powell, concurring, dwells on certain aspects
of the Williams facts suggesting involuntariness. Id.
at 1245.
71 Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
applying due process standards to precharging iden-
tification procedures, with Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967), applying the right to counsel to postcharg-
ing activity.
72 Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. at 1240 (footnote
omitted).
73 But see Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1977)
(specific oral or written waiver of representation by
counsel at interrogation required before interroga-
tion can commence).
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not the fact of commencement of formal pro-
ceedings alone. In both Massiah and Brewer the
defendants were indeed represented at the
time of questioning. Neither decision, there-
fore, had to contend with the matter of whether
one charged but not yet represented must have
counsel supplied before interrogation .74 If that
must be done, then Williams will have a major
impact on interrogation practices; but, if the
question is one of actual appointment or reten-
tion of counsel, then presumably relatively few
cases will be affected by it. Moreover, in fore-
casting the decision's effect, one cannot ignore
the fact that two attorneys representing Wil-
liams obtained specific commitments from law
enforcement officials that they would not inter-
rogate him. Despite those commitments, the
principal investigator engaged in conversa-
tional tactics that appeared to have the clear
purpose of eliciting incriminating responses.
5
However, if there were no such specific com-
mitment, would the decision have gone as it
did? Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, essen-
tial to the five-Justice majority, dwells on that
aspect of the Williams facts. Eliminate Stevens'
opinion and one might project a different out-
come in a case in which officers otherwise met
Miranda requirements .76
The dissenting Justices were more concerned
about the likelihood that Williams would go
free of charges of murdering a child because
of the invocation of a derivative exclusionary
rule, which would exclude evidence of the
I Under Wade-Gilbert, there is authority allowing
appointment or provision of special counsel for pur-
poses of identification proceedings. Zamora v. Guam,
394 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1968); Thompson v. State, 85
Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893
(1969); see also People v. Dates, 52 Mich. App. 544,
218 N.W.2d 100 (1974) (semble: counsel supplied un-
der state rule requiring counsel for photographic
identification procedures).
" See also State v. Weedon, 342 So. 2d 642 (La.
1977) (statement by defendant made during booking
excluded because of commitment by officers to attor-
ney that defendant would not be interrogated).
71 The-surreptitious interrogation aspects of Mas-
siah seem no longer important under Williams: "That
the incriminating statements were elicited surrepti-
tiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is
constitutionally irrelevant." 97 S. Ct. at 1240. That
suggests the appropriateness of reevaluating such
decisions as State v. Daugherty, 221 Kan. 612, 562
P.2d 42 (1977), and People v. Cardona, 41 N.Y.2d
333, 360 N.E.2d 1306, 392 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1977), which
give prominence to this feature ofMassiah.
condition of the child's body, than they were
about excluding Williams' confession itself.
77
The majority recognizes the problem and in
dictum endeavors to forestall it by recognizing
the "inevitable discovery" doctrine 7 as a limita-
tion on the derivative evidence rule. Such a
doctrine, if ultimately ratified by the Court,
might well have application in fourth amend-
ment settings as well.
F. Eyewitness Identification Proceedings
The Court substantially reduced the impact
of its earlier decisions applying due process
standards to identification procedures79 by re-
fusing to invoke a per se exclusionary rule in
such instances. If a per se rule were adopted,
an eyewitness would have been precluded from
testifying on the identification issue if he or
she had participated in identification proce-
dures subsequently determined to have violated
standards of fundamental fairness. The "taint"-
"fruit" standard for determining whether to
allow identification testimony in postcharging
lineup cases, namely, whether a witness's
impressions actually went back to the time of
the criminal transaction or simply to the time
of confrontation under police auspices, 0 has
proven to be the Achilles heel of Wade-Gilbert
doctrine. Perusal of the plethora of decisions
on this point over the past decade shows that
few appellate courts will overturn a lower court
decision when an independent basis for a wit-
ness's identification testimony existed. A num-
ber of courts and writers had assumed, how-
ever, that the only appropriate sanction for a
violation of basic due process rights in the
identification context is an automatic exclusion
rule. That approached was rejected by the
7 "With the exclusionary rule operating as the
Court effectuates it, the decision today probably
means that, as a practical matter, no new trial will be
possible at this date eight years after the crime, and
that this respondent necessarily will go free." 97 S.
Ct. at 1261 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78 "[Elvidence of where the body was found and
of its condition might well be admissible on the
theory that the body would have been discovered in
any event, even had incriminating statements not
been elicited from Williams." 97 S. Ct. at 1243 n.12.
79 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
so United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
The prosecution must be given an opportunity to
establish the independent basis of such testimony.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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Court in Manson v. Brathwaite.s'
The decision recognizes that important pol-
icy factors have been advanced to support a
per se exclusionary rule. Nonetheless, counter-
vailing policies merit priority, according to the
Court. Accordingly, though the per se rule
aims to keep unreliable evidence from juries, it
goes too far through its "automatic" and "per-
emptory" application to exclude what may be
reliable and relevant evidence. The per se rule
is also designed to deter police misconduct, but
the majority opinion concludes that an equiva-
lent effect is wrought because unreliable evi-
dence will be excluded, and officers cannot be
sure that the evidence they obtain outside
proper procedures will be characterized as re-
liable. Finally, in a balancing approach identical
to that now manifested in fourth amendment 2
and confession (Miranda) cases,s3 a per se ex-
clusionary rule may frustrate justice by allowing
a guilty person to go free, when reliable evi-
dence is excluded in an effort to compel police
to revise their investigatory methods. Such con-
siderations impel the conclusion, according to
the majority of the Court, that reliability of
identification evidence is the hallmark of ad-
missibility under due process standards.84
In sum, the Court has put to rest the enter-
prise, flowing from the Warren Court days, of
controlling police conduct through sweeping
exclusionary rules. Courts may have an oppor-
tunity from time to time to comment on police
methods of obtaining identifications, but it is
likely to be a rare event when a state or federal
court, on federal due process grounds, upsets
a jury verdict based on confident assertions by
witnesses of the identification of defendants as
perpetrators .85
81 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
82 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1976).
83 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
84 Factors listed by the Court as important include
opportunity of a witness to view a criminal at the
time of a crime, the witness' degree of attention,
accuracy of earlier description of the criminal, the
level of certainty of identification expressed at a
confrontation, and the time elapsed between crime
and confrontation. Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct.
at 2253.
' It also seems inevitable that the exhaustion of
remedies requirements, set forth for confessions is-
sues in Wainwright v. Sykes, discussed in text accom-
panying notes 63-67 supra, will be applied in all




The Court determined several issues during
the Term which have significance for the con-
duct of grand jury proceedings. One governs
the procedures to be followed if unconstitu-
tional discrimination in the selection ofjuries is
asserted.86 In Castaneda v. Partida, a state pris-
oner sought federal habeas corpus on the
ground that Mexican-Americans had been sys-
tematically excluded from grand jury panels,
including that which had indicted him, thus
denying him equal protection.87 Statistical data
which he advanced showed that half or less of
typical grand juries were composed of His-
panic-surnamed individuals in a county in
which nearly eighty percent were of that ethnic
origin. The state, in response, relied on little
else than the fact that three of the five persons
responsible for preparation ofjury panels were
also Hispanic-surnamed. It urged the conclu-
sion be drawn that these persons would not
discriminate against those of similar origins.
The Court sustained the appeals court's ruling
that habeas should issue under such circum-
stances.
Relatively few jurisdictions will be affected
by Partida, since most provide for random
selection based on voter lists, a practice which
appears to forestall equal protection attacks.8
Even in instances in which there may be dis-
crimination, the Partida holding establishes
nothing new in constitutional doctrine. Instead,
it serves only to confirm that state authorities
are unwise to ignore the procedural burden
which establishment by defendants of statistical
discrepancy between ethnic percentages in
population and juror lists places on them to
show a valid explanation for such a discrep-
ancy. In some instances no valid explanation
may be possible. But in a county system in
which minority (or in Partida, majority) repre-
86 Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
87 Under such cases as Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954); and Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
"' See Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. at 1275 n.1;
cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)
(three-year lag in revising federal jury lists, so that
no panelist could be younger than 24, did not violate
Constitution).
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sentatives participate in determining juror eli-
gibility, all that need be done is prove by
testimony that there are valid criteria for selec-
tion like literacy, mental condition, moral char-
acter and past criminal records.8
9
Grand jury witnesses traditionally have had
no right to be warned about the privilege
against self-incrimination before questions are
put to them. The Court is clearly disinclined to
tamper with that tradition on constitutional
grounds. In United States v. Wong, 90 it reaf-
firmed its 1976 Mandujano9' holding that no
infringement upon self-incrimination rights,
even assumed arguendo, justifies perjury, and
held in addition that omission of warnings is
not so fundamentally unfair as to deny due
process of law. The Court continued to skirt
about the issue, dealt with only in the Mandu-
jano plurality opinion, whether Miranda warn-
ing requirements, as such, govern grand jury
proceedings. That matter again was disre-
garded in United States v. Washington9 2 because
the prosecutor conducting the federal grand
jury proceeding in question gave a slightly
adapted version of Miranda warnings to a target
witness. Washington claimed that warnings
should have been given before a witness en-
tered a grand jury room, so that he or she
would have time to ponder their significance
and would not be in danger of producing an
adverse inference of guilt drawn by grand
jurors who would hear the warning. The Court
rejected this contention. Warnings given in a
grand jury's presence gain solemnity in the
process, and the grand jury is but an investiga-
tive body, "not the final arbiter of guilt or
innocence."
93
Nevertheless, despite the disinclination of
the Court to decide the Miranda issue in Wash-
ington, its discussion in Beckwith,' coupled with
its decision in Mathiason,95 leaves little like-
lihood that it will apply Miranda to formal
proceedings like grand jury hearings. That is
as it should be, since there is no logical or
doctrinal reason why a specialized application
89 See Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. at 1282.
9o 97 S. Ct. 1823 (1977).
"' United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1975).
92 97 S. Ct. 1814 (1977).
9
3 Id. at 1821.
94 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976);
see Skinner, supra note 2, at 365-66.
9' Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 58-60supra.
of privilege like Miranda should be allowed to
govern the historical privilege when law en-
forcement officials are not directly involved. If
warnings to all witnesses, including grand jury
witnesses, are fairer, the matter should be dealt
with by statute or court rule, since the Court
has clearly stated that the matter is not one for
resolution under the due proess clause.
The Court dealt once more with the problem
of prohibited penalties under the fifth amend-
ment. In this instance a state statute divested
political party officials of party office and dis-
abled them from serving in a similar capacity
for five years after refusing to waive immunity
before a grand jury or other specified
tribunal.9 6 Continuing the position taken in
earlier decisions, that public employees cannot
be discharged,9 7 professional persons disci-
plined, 8 or individuals disqualified from con-
tracting with governmental entities,99 the Court
ruled that the sort of disqualification mandated
by the state legislation produced social and
professional consequences which constituted a
prohibited penalty when triggered by a valid
claim of privilege. Moreover, the opinion notes
that Cunningham was forced to balance one
right against another in violation of the Sim-
mons'00 ban against such choices. In this in-
stance he was forced to weigh the fifth amend-
ment privilege against the right to participate
in private voluntary political associations.
Thus, those conducting grand jury and other
investigative proceedings cannot demand
waiver of immunity. If those responsible for
conducting these proceedings want informa-
tion then a source must be immunized against
all use, including that affecting livelihood as
quite broadly delineated by the Court. The
96 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 97 S. Ct. 2132 (1977).
97 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (incriminating admissions
obtained under threat of discharge unusable in crim-
inal prosecution).
18 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
" Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
100 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389
(1968) (defendant could not be forced to choose
between vindication of fourth amendment rights
through freedom to testify in support of a motion to
suppress and preservation of privilege through si-
lence in such proceedings; the Court privileged testi-




majority opinion also suggests that these prob-
lems can be avoided by providing for use im-
munity (prohibition against using specific an-
swers and evidence derivative from them)
rather than transactional immunity (disability
to prosecute for any crime arising from the
transaction to which testimony relates). The
former is an available constitutional option. 10 1
How practical that suggestion is, however, is
open to debate, since there appears to be reluc-
tance on the part of most sources, acting on
advice of counsel, to accept use rather than
transactional immunity.
Efforts to exploit the Court's earlier indica-
tions that due process might be infringed if
institution of formal charges were delayed to
the point where important defense evidence
was lost 102 have failed. In United States v. Lo-
vasco,1 0 3 the prosecution did not present Lo-
vasco's case to a grand jury until seventeen
months after the defendant's possible commis-
sion of a crime had come to the government's
attention. During that time a witness material
to Lovasco's defense died. In reliance on the
Marion statements, the trial court dismissed the
charges and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court first noted that Marion held only
that proof of actual prejudice makes a due
process claim ready for adjudication but does
not automatically justify a claim for relief. In-
stead, "the due process inquiry must consider
the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice
to the accused."1' Because it is unprofessional
conduct for prosecutors to recommend indict-
ments on less than probable cause, hasty action
on their part is improper. Beyond that, how-
ever, fairness can justify delay until the govern-
ment believes that it can prove a case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Premature prosecution can
result in frustrated investigations into other
wrongdoing, unneeded multiple indictments,
subjection of defendants to charges which
might otherwise not be brought, and inade-
quate evaluation of the basic desirability of
"'1 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Inves-
tigations, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
102 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26
(1971) (delayed arrest). After formal charges have
been filed, the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), governs.
10 97 S. Ct. 2044 (1977).
10 Id. at 2049.
moving against individuals in given circum-
stances. Since some or all of these factors gov-
erned the delay in Lovasco's case, it was error
to grant him immunity from prosecution, even
though his defense "might have been somewhat
prejudiced by the lapse of time."10 5
B. Guilty Plea Practice
As the Court has confirmed, there is no
right to engage in plea negotiations*106 If a
prosecutor or a trial court refuses to accept
plea bargains except those without sentence
concessions and based on the most serious
offense charged, defendants can obtain no fed-
eral constitutional relief. But if, as appears to
be the prevailing policy in most jurisdictions,
plea negotiations continue to be standard prac-
tice, careful procedural requirements must be
met.
This was confirmed in what may be a large
body of dictum in Blackledge v. Allison.10 7 The
formal concern was over whether a federal
district court properly denied a habeas fact-
finding hearing on a claim that a promise
bearing on sentence had been defaulted
upon 108 in reliance on a form embodying yes
or no responses to stereotyped inquiries, signed
by defendant and adopted by the trial court.
The Court held that a record or document of
that sort would not automatically preclude an
evidentiary hearing by the habeas court.
However, the decision can be taken as an
encouragement to bringing plea negotiations
into the open, at least after the fact, through
true, adequately recorded inquiry. Pointing to
reforms in North Carolina procedure after
Allison had been decided, the Court noted that
"[t]he careful explication of the legitimacy of
plea bargaining, the questioning of both law-
yers, and the verbatim record of their answers
at the guilty plea proceedings would almost
surely have shown whether any bargain did
exist and, if so, insured that it was not ig-
nored."0 9 In this context, in contrast to its
position on availability of confessions issues on
105 Id. at 2052.
10 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560-61
(1977).
107 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977).
108 Either such a commitment must be honored or
the plea must be vacated. Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
10 Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. at 1632.
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federal habeas corpus," 0 the Court has left
some encouragement for prisoners in jurisdic-
tions with primitive plea practices to litigate
cases arising from them, while at the same
time manifesting a disinclination to use federal





The Court considered several important as-
pects of the double jeopardy clause."' One is
the status of lesser included offenses under the
"same offense" aspect of the prohibition against
repeated proceedings. This in turn requires a
consideration of the Blockburger standard "for
determining whether two offenses are suffi-
ciently distinguishable to permit the imposition
of cumulative punishment":
The applicable rule is that where the same act
or transaction constitutes a violation of two dis-
tinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not.
1 2
The Court made clear in two decisions of
the Term"13 that lesser included offenses are
within the same offense as the most serious
crime charged. In Brown, the defendant was
convicted of joyriding and later charged with
theft of the same vehicle on the same occasion.
In Jeffers, that relationship was found to exist
between two provisions of the federal con-
trolled substances act. 4 When such a finding
is made on the basis of statutory construction,
it does not matter in which order the separate
trials occur. One proceeding on either exhausts
the power of the government to proceed.
There are circumstances, recognized in
110 See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'12 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932), quoted in Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225
(1977).
112 Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977); Jeffers v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977).
114 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 848 (1970). The Court distin-
guished lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975),
because different provisions of the act were involved,
which did not bear the relationship inter se of greater
and lesser included offenses.
Brown and Jeffers, in which repeated proceed-
ings are possible. Thus, if circumstances which
aggravate a lesser offense into a greater offense
either have not occurred at the time of the first
trial or could not have been discovered in the
exercise of due diligence by that time, retrial
on the more serious charge is permissible.'
1 '
Any effort to cumulate punishments for both
greater and lesser offenses constitutes pro-
hibited multiple punishment." 6 Moreover, if a
defendant successfully moves to sever trial or
resists prosecution efforts to consolidate
charges or even fails to assert that greater or
lesser charges are involved in a repetitive pros-
ecution, double jeopardy objections are
waived.1
17
The content of counts also can be governed
by double jeopardy considerations. In Brown v.
Ohio, the prosecution carved a nine-day joyrid-
ing transaction into a period of unauthorized
use and a period of theft. This the Court
would not allow. The Court stated, "The Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guar-
antee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations
by the simple expedient of dividing a single
crime into a series of temporal or spatial
units.""8 The converse problem of duplicitous
counts (a single count alleging commission of
two or more offenses) raises primary problems
in the context of the defendant's claim to know
the nature and cause of the accusations against
him." 9 However, if a defendant obtains an
instruction that a jury must unanimously find
beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of
all the crimes charged in a, duplicitous count,
and a guilty verdict is returned, a defendant
cannot object to retrial on one of the crimes
charged if a defense appeal results in retrial.
1 20
For all of the purposes discussed above,
the felony murder doctrine and the specific
M Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. at 2227 n.7; Jeffers v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. at 2216-17.
116 "Fines, of course, are treated in the same way
as prison sentences for purposes of double jeopardy
and multiple punishment analysis." Jeffers v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. at 2218.
1
17 Id. at 2217.
11 Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. at 2227.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to jury trial
also is involved, in that it is possible for some jurors
to convict on the basis of one offense while others
utilize one or more of the others. See Abney v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (1977).
120 Abney v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 2043.
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This Term's "same offense" decisions do not
place the Court behind the same transaction
test which some jurisdictions have adopted.
122
Coupled with the collateral estoppel cases,'
123
however, the Court has moved far enough
toward the coverage of the broader test (which
in effect works compulsory joinder of all of-
fenses relating to the same act or transaction
or related series of acts or transactions) that
there seems little reason to hold back from
incorporating it into the fifth amendment.
The other primary issues dealt with by the
Court are the circumstances under which trial
courts can terminate proceedings without bar-
ring retrial and the related matter of the pros-
ecution's ability to appeal termination orders.
Until a defendant has been placed injeopardy,
either through the swearing of a jury or com-
mencement of the evidentiary process in a
bench trial,' 24 proceedings can be halted and
restarted until either a speedy trial has been
denied or the prescriptive period has run.
There seems to be no due process bar against
such activities. But once jeopardy has attached
retrial is possible only under certain circum-
stances: (1) the first trial results in a deadlocked
jury; 125 (2) trial must be interrupted because of
manifest necessity; 126 (3) the defense moves for
mistrial or the necessity for mistrial can be
traced to defense misconduct; 27 or (4) the
defense appeals a conviction successfully.
1 28
Only if a trial court grants a mistrial without
adequate cause over defense objection or with-
out defense concurrence is retrial barred.
29
If a jury acquits a defendant,' 30 the prosecu-
1 Harris v. Oklahoma, 97 S. Ct. 2912 (1977).
122 See, e.g., Cranmpton v. 54-A District Judge, 397
Mich. 489, 245 N.W.2d 28 (1976).
12 Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971); Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
'4 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 97
S. Ct. 1349, 1353-54 (1977).
in United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
126 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
27 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
'2 Abney v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 2043.
129 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-87
(1971).
130 Conviction of a lesser included offense on some
but not all of the counts in a multiple count indict-
ment has the effect of an acquittal of the rest of the
crimes charged, barring retrial on them after success-
ful appeal. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
Recall also that retrial cannot result in enhanced
tion cannot appeal on the merits' 3' because
that would subject defendant to a repeated
trial on the merits. Exactly the same results
follow if acquittal follows bench trial,' 3 2 if a
trial court rules for the defense on the merits
based on stipulated or agreed-to facts13 3 or if a
defense motion for acquittal is reserved and
then acted favorably upon following report of
a deadlocked jury.134
The related mode of raising these important
issues is in terms of the prosecution right to
appeal. At the threshhold, since there is no
right to appeal on the part of either party,'
3'
an authorizing statute or rule is needed before
prosecution appeal is possible. If, however,
there is a general authorization to that end, it
must be construed against the backdrop of the
double jeopardy provision. If a prosecution is
terminated favorably to the defense before
defendant has been placed in jeopardy, for
example by a finding that a criminal pleading
is fatally defective 136 or by a suppression order
affecting key prosecution evidence,'3 7 the gov-
ernment properly may be allowed an appeal."'
punishment unless factors subsequent to appeal, es-
tablished on the record, justify that enhancement.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). An
exception to the latter rule applies if juries sentence
and a later jury is unaware of the sentence earlier
assessed. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973);
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119-20 (1972)
(appeal in form of de novo trial).
'31 There is no objection to use of advisory opin-
ions, but few states allow for the practice.
132 United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976).
13 Finch v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2909 (1977).
"34 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 97
S. Ct. 1349, 1356-57 (1977). The Court found that
action under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c) amounts to a
determination on the merits even though delayed
until after a jury has proven unable to agree on a
verdict.
135 Abney v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 2038-39.
136 United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976);
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
"37 United States v. Kopp, 429 U.S. 121 (1976);
United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5 (1976); United
States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976)..
138 Abney v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 2040-41,
treats a trial court rejection of a defense claim of
double jeopardy as a final judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1970). Such a decision is critical to a defend-
ant's triability, and if interlocutory appeal is not
allowed may result in the very harm which the double
jeopardy provision is designed to prevent-repetitive
trial. Grounds other than double jeopardy cannot be
considered on such an appeal even though a trial
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A reversal of such a trial court ruling will bring
a first trial, not a repeated trial. At the other
end of trial court proceedings, if after convic-
tion a court grants a defense motion in arrest
of judgment or for a new trial, the prosecution
can be allowed to appeal because reversal of
the ultimate trial court action will but restore
the jury finding, not subject a defendant to
further trial proceedings. 139 It is only when
jeopardy has attached that a successful appeal
by the prosecution, no matter, how well
founded in principles of abstract law, will result
in retrial, and this the double jeopardy concept
in Anglo-American law is designed to pre-




B. Allocation of Burden of Persuasion
Only in rare circumstances has the Supreme
Court undertaken to consider points of state
criminal law under the guise of evaluating the
validity of instructions. That has been a tech-
nique reserved for interpreting points of fed-
eral law. 142 The Court's 1975 Mullaney v. Wil-
bur14 3 decision, however, led to efforts to trans-
late criminal law doctrine into a constitutional
matter through alleging a legislative lessening
of the prosecution responsibility to establish all
elements of a substantive offense through
court took cognizance of them in rejecting defense
efforts to forestall trial.
If the government seeks a rehearing or reconsid-
eration of a federal district court action favoring the
defense in matters like a suppression hearing, that
renders the original order nonfinal for purposes of
the running of the period for filing a government
appeal. United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976).
139 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-53
(1975).
140 United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
141 See also Finch v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2909
(1977) (dismissal of indictment on grounds federal
territorial jurisdiction was lacking was equivalent to
acquittal on merits which precluded government ap-
peal); Lee v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977)
(trial court deferred motion to dismiss indictment as
defective until after bench trial and then granted it,
indicating at the same time that the evidence was
ample to convict; retrial was permissible under Dinitz).
142 See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 97 S.
Ct. 1963 (1977) (scope of federal firearms legislation);
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (con-
struction of "willfully" in I.R.C.).
143 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (state could not place on
defense the burden of persuading the trier of fact of
the existence of passion or provocation sufficient to
reduce murder to manslaughter).
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1 44 Something
of a check has been placed on such efforts
through the Court's decision in Patterson v.
New York. 145
In Patterson the trial court instructed, in
conformity with New York law, that if the
defendant was shown beyond a reasonable
doubt by the prosecution to have intended to
cause the death of another and in fact to have
caused the death of that or another person,
the jury could convict of second-degree mur-
der, and that it was then incumbent on the
defendant to establish that he had acted under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there was a reasonable explanation
or excuse. State appellate courts rejected the
claim that such a transfer of the burden of
persuasion to the defense was proscribed by
Mullaney, finding that no responsibility was
placed by the statute on the defense to disprove
an element which the state had to establish in
order to justify convictability. The Supreme
Court agreed.
In holding as it did, the Court also confirmed
the continued viability of a relatively elderly
decision 46 allowing the burden to be placed on
defendants to establish mental condition (in-
sanity) as a defense to criminal responsibility.
In effect, due process is satisfied if the prose-
cution is required to establish each specific
element of the crime charged; thereafter, proof
establishing affirmative defenses can be made
the responsibility of the defense. Only if a
legislature should attempt to exploit such a
distinction through excessive use of presump-
tions would due process intervention be appro-
priate.
Patterson does not eliminate Mullaney as a
viable constitutional principle, at least as the
Court views it. Indeed, it was important
enough to be given retroactive effect.147 But it
'" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
145 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
140 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The
majority opinion in Patterson also indicates that this
was accomplished through Rivera v. Delaware, 429
U.S. 877 (1976), in which the Court dismissed an
appeal alleging unconstitutionality of a statute requir-
ing defendants to prove the insanity defense by a
preponderance; the Court found no substantial fed-
eral issue.
117 Hankerson v. North Carolina, 97 S. Ct. 2339
(1977). The criminal law doctrine involved in Hanker-
son was self-defense, which the state court thought
could not be made a phase of a case which the
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would seem that as long as a state statute sets
forth an act (or equivalent) and a culpability
(mens rea) requirement in some form which
the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, any doctrine which reduces
or destroys criminality can be made the respon-
sibility of the defense to establish .1
48
Defendants who wish to transform questions
of the propriety of instructions into issues of
due process must move timely in trial court to
present the issue. In Henderson v. Kibbe, 149 a
state prisoner complained that a failure on the
part of a state trial court in a homicide case to
instruct on causation denied him due process.
After relief had been refused in state courts
and a federal district court, a federal court of
appeals characterized the failure to raise the
issue promptly and properly in state court as
"obviously inadvertent" and granted relief on
the basis that a failure to instruct on an impor-
tant element of an offense created a risk that a
jury might not make the requisite constitutional
finding on each element the prosecution is
required to prove. Without reaching the mer-
its, the Court reversed. While not ruling out
absolutely the possibility that an improper in-
struction could warrant reversal on constitu-
tional grounds even though no objection was
made, the burden of establishing extreme prej-
udice is on the defense. In addition, the de-
fense must meet a higher standard than gov-
erns regular appeals. In the absence of a draft
defense instruction or other procedure to pose
the constitutional issue, and in light of the fact
that causation was covered through a standard
instruction, there was no basis for federal inter-
vention. In short, the procedural requirements
of Kibbe coupled with the substantive due proc-
ess standards of Patterson leave quite limited
scope for the construction of criminal law in-
structions under the due process clause.
defense must establish if Mullaney were given retro-
active effect. The Supreme Court disagreed on the
matter of retroactivity but did not find the Mullaney
status of self-defense to have been preserved for
federal review. In light of the analysis in Patterson it
seems most clear that the burden of establishing
something in the nature of confession and avoidance,
which self-defense and other doctrines ofjustification
are, can constitutionally be placed on the defense.
148 The Court's handling of Leland v. Oregon, 345
U.S. 790 (1952), suggests that its approval of a defense
burden stated in terms of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt rather than by a preponderance still stands.




The impact of some of the Court's pro-
nouncements on scope of federal habeas corpus
has been noted passim above. It may, however,
be useful to comment briefly on the procedural
significance of some of these decisions.
That habeas corpus deserves its appellation
of the great writ cannot be gainsaid. In a
federal system, however, it has caused consid-
erable problems, in that the legislatively stated
ground of "custody in violation of the Consti-
tution . . . of the United States"150 has given
ready access to federal courts by state prisoners
with even the limited imagination required to
convert investigative, pretrial or trial proce-
dural error into a matter of constitutional sig-
nificance.' 51 Since 1971 the Court has steadily
increased the barriers which state prisoners
must hurdle before obtaining a hearing on the
merits of their claims.152
150 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970).
11 Another problem has been the venue of habeas
corpus, the place of detention, which has concen-
trated the load of habeas corpus petitions in districts
in which penal institutions are located. A statutory
postconviction review proceeding commenced in a
sentencing court eliminates this problem; the Court
has reconfirmed that utilization of such a remedy is
required unless a petitioner can establish that the
statutory remedy is less adequate than habeas corpus.
Swain v. Pressley, 97 S. Ct. 1224 (1977), applying to a
District of Columbia proceeding the same construc-
tion earlier used to sustain the validity of the plenary
federal postconviction review proceeding, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1970). United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952).
Traditional rigid venue requirements in state cases
were also relaxed somewhat in Braden v. 30th Judi-
cial Circuit, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), which allows federal
habeas to be lodged in either the federal district in
which a state prisoner is confined or that in which
state officials whose conduct is complained of are to
be found.
152 Federal courts in habeas proceedings cannot
redetermine factual issues adequately dealt with in
recent state proceedings' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970),
legislatively restating the rule of Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963). A detail of this is dealt with in
part II-A of Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232
(1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 68-78
supra. The Court noted the propriety of an agree-
ment by the parties that a case be decided on a state
trial court record; new factual findings beyond those
made by the state court were carefully explained and
based on the record, making them proper under the
circumstances.
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The principal means of controlling state pris-
oner habeas applications is by strictly applying
the legislative requirement' 53 that an applicant
has exhausted state remedies.154 In Wainwright
v. Sykes, 5 the Court held that a failure to offer
a timely objection in state court on a matter of
federal constitutional significance creates an
adequate and independent state legal ground
which precludes federal court consideration of
what otherwise would be a clear federal issue.
156
Sykes asserted a Miranda objection for the first
time in state postconviction proceedings. Then,
on federal habeas corpus, a federal district
court ruled that Sykes had a right to a Jackson
v. Denno157 hearing on the matter. The court
of appeals affirmed, noting that the burden
was on the state to establish the admissibility of
a confession, not on the defendant to demand
that it be established. The Supreme Court
disagreed and held that a failure to take advan-
tage of a procedural device before or during
trial sufficient to present the matter constitutes
an independent and adequate state ground
which forestalls examination of the matter
through federal habeas corpus.
The Court finds several policy reasons in
support of its conclusion. One is that a contem-
poraneous objection rule is widely encountered
in the United States because it facilitates an
early determination of objections on the basis
of fresh evidence. Well-founded objections in
some instances produce early termination of
proceedings on federal grounds, thus promot-
Iu 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
15 The Court noted three other related issues
bearing on the availability of federal habeas corpus:
the types of claims which might be litigated; the
degree of deference to be paid to earlier state deter-
minations in the same matter; and determination of
what amounts to an exhaustion of remedies in a
given state, but found none to be presented by the
particular case. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. at
2506-08.
1" 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
156 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970) allows a federal court
or judge to accept a habeas corpus proceeding only
on the basis of a claim that a prisoner is detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States. This is taken to mean that if state law
offers a nonfederal ground to dispose of a matter, a
habeas petition should be dismissed. Absent a clear
indication, however, that there is an alternative state
procedural ground, a failure to exhaust remedies or
a patently correct disposition of a matter in state
courts, an application should not be summarily dis-
missed. Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977),
discussed in text accompanying notes 107-10supra.
157 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
ing a finality to criminal litigation.' 8 Moreover,
a contrary rule can promote what the Court
calls "sand bagging," in which defense counsel
gamble on a jury acquittal and then, barring
that outcome, advance federal issues in post-
conviction proceedings." 9 Finally, a contem-
poraneous objection rule accords to state pro-
ceedings the character of "a decisive and por-
tentous event." 160 Any rule which "encourages
the result that those proceedings be as free of
error as possible is thoroughly desirable," since
it makes them the "'main event,' so to speak,
rather than a tryout on the road for what will
later be the determinative federal habeas hear-
ing.' 6'a In this fashion, the Court places the
quietus on its earlier expansive precedent
which forestalled federal review only in excep-
tional circumstances.162 Under the new regi-
men, a failure to make timely objection to what
is later asserted to be federal constitutional
error can be circumvented only through a
showing that there was good cause for not
complying with local requirements of a prompt
objection and the claimed constitutional viola-
tion resulted in actual prejudice to a peti-
tioner163 Sykes made no such showing, and it
"' The opinion notes that even if a constitutional
objection is overruled a prosecutor nevertheless may
decide to withdraw prosecution because of the possi-
bility a state appellate or federal habeas court might
rule the other way. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. at
2507.
159 Presumably this aspect of the Court's opinion
will preclude claims that a failure by counsel to
render a timely objection constitutes incompetency
of counsel under the sixth amendment, since a con-
trary ruling would allow state prisoners to submit in
alternative guise the very issue which the Court in
Sykes holds to be dispositive of federal habeas corpus.
Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 n.5
(1976) (failure to pursue a detailed request for discov-
ery does not demonstrate ineffectiveness of counsel).
160 Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. at 2508.
[T]he accused is in the court room, the jury is
in the box, the judge is on the bench, and the
witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly
sworn, await their turns to testify. Society's re-
sources have been concentrated at that time and
place in order to decide, within the limits of
human fallibility, the question of guilt or inno-
cence of one of its citizens.
Id.
'161 Id.
162 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
16 The requirements distilled in Sykes from Francis
v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), and Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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is doubtful that many state prisoners repre-
sented by counsel during state proceedings will
be able to make such a showing."
B. Federal Civil Rights Act Proceedings
During the era of wide-ranging federal ex-
amination of state legal administration on the
basis of federal constitutional standards, per-
sons unable to meet the procedural require-
ments for federal habeas corpus increasingly
resorted to civil damage, injunctive or declara-
tory judgment proceedings under the Federal
Civil Rights Act. 165 Beginning with Younger v.
Harris6" in 1971, however, the Court has en-
gaged in the same process of progressive re-
strictions on civil federal relief that has charac-
terized its treatment of federal habeas corpus.
One mode of proceeding has been to expand
the forms of state proceedings governed by
Younger v. Harris, which requires that all possi-
ble state procedural avenues be utilized before
turning to federal courts. The Younger series
of cases all involved actual or threatened crimi-
nal prosecutions, but in 1975 the Court applied
exactly the same standards to what might be
called quasi-criminal or collateral enforcement
proceedings.167 In 1977, the Court extended
these restrictions to actions by civil judgment
debtors attacking their incarceration, 6 s and
then to all litigation, no matter its formal char-
acteristics, to which a state is a party and
concerning which federal constitutional objec-
tions have been advanced. 69 Only if a proceed-
ing is alleged and proven to have been "moti-
vated by a desire to harass or is conducted in
bad faith, or where the challenged statute is
'flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sen-
tence and paragraph, and in whatever manner
and against whomever an effort might be made
to apply it,'"' 7 0 or a federal constitutional issue
cannot be litigated in the state hearings on the
'6 Granted the Court's attitude toward self-repre-
sentation in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),
see also Allen, supra note 55, at 391-93, pro se defend-
ants will receive the same treatment.
165 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
166 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and companion decisions.
167 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)
(state padlock law invoked against premises used to
purvey obscene matter).
'6' Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977).
169 Trainor v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977).
170 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 611,
quoted in Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. at 1218.
merits,' 7 ' may federal intervention be proper.
Another limitation on civil rights act pro-
ceedings, similar to that governing habeas cor-
pus, is that available state remedies be invoked
before resorting to federal remedies. If plain-
tiffs could have raised their federal issues in
the course of state proceedings but did not,
they are barred from asserting them in civil
rights act form. 72
Finally, actual harm must be posed by a state
proceeding even if abstention and exhaustion
of remedies requirements are met. Abstract or
hypothetical questions cannot be advanced.
73
The latter concern embraces a criminal judg-
ment and collateral consequences not assailed
in state proceedings. 74 However, if further
prosecutions (or other state proceedings em-
braced within Trainor) are likely to flow from
activity protected by the federal constitution,
Civil Rights Act intervention is proper, as May-
nard illustrates. In Maynard, the plaintiff had
already been prosecuted three times in five
weeks for driving his automobile with the motto
on its license plates obscured . 75 He did not
seek to annul those convictions or their collat-
eral consequences, but rather to prevent re-
peated future prosecutions which would
threaten the ability of plaintiff and wife to
"perform the ordinary tasks of daily life which
require an automobile.' ' 76 Thus, Maynard be-
comes one of a limited group of cases 77 in
which state plaintiffs have been successful in
7 Vail distinguishes the pretrial detention case of
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), on this ground,
since the Court noted in Pugh that errors in pretrial
detention (or arrest) procedures have no impact on
the power of a court to proceed to trial. 97 S. Ct. at
1218.
1
72 Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. at 1218, "Here it is
abundantly clear that appellees had an opportunity to
present their federal claims in the state proceedings.
No more is required to invoke Younger abstention."
(Emphasis in original). See also Jones y. Hildebrant,
97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977) (certiorari dismissed as improvi-
dently granted when it appeared civil rights act issue
had not been presented to state courts).
t73 Ashcroft v. Mattis, 97 S. Ct. 1739 (1977) (basic
issue of damages, sought in federal proceeding,
already determined favorably to plaintiff in state
proceedings).
174 Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977).
1' Plaintiff and wife found the slogan "Live Free
or Die" repugnant to their beliefs as Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. The Court ruled that prosecution on the
grounds asserted violated their first amendment
rights.
176 Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S. Ct. at 1434.
17 E.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
1977]
B. J. GEORGE, JR.
obtaining relief in criminal law related matters.
Narrow, indeed, is the gateway leading to fed-
eral relief in this form.
V
PRISONERS' STATUS
One form of litigation concerning which the
Court has rather sparingly invoked the stric-
tures on civil rights litigation, as discussed
above, involves objections to prison conditions
and procedures bottomed on the eighth
amendment ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The Court during the 1976 Term once
more considered prisoner claims on the merits,
displaying a certain ambivalence in the process.
On the one hand, it continues to recognize
that, judged by essentially administrative due
process standards, prisoners can be denied
fundamental rights during incarceration 17 or
termination of probation or parole status.1
7 9
On the other hand, it has evinced manifest
reluctance to place federal courts "astride the
day-to-day functioning of state prisons and
involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary
decisions that are not the business of federal
judges.' 8'i That wavering between polar ex-
tremes remained observable in three decisions
concerning the status of state prisoners.
In Bounds v. Smith,'' the Court ruled that if
penal authorities do not provide adequate legal
assistance to residents' 8 they must make avail-
able adequate legal reference materials 8'3 so
178 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pro-
cunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
179 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
180 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976)
(Court refuses to inquire into prisoner assignments
and transfers unless for clearly punitive purposes).
See also Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976)
(same issue as Fano); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308 (1976) (self-incrimination privilege does not pre-
vent drawing adverse inference from prisoner's re-
fusal to comment on disciplinary charges).
181 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977).
182 Among the alternatives are the training of
inmates as para-legal assistants to work under
lawyers' supervision, the use of paraprofession-
als and law students, either as volunteers or in
formal clinical programs, the organization of
volunteer attorneys through bar associations or
other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-
time consultant basis, and the use of full-time
staff attorneys, working either in new prison
legal assistance organizations or as part of public
defender or legal service offices.
Id. at 1499-1500.
,M' See id. at 1493-94 n.4 for possible standards
governing adequacy of prison library collections.
that the prisoners can conduct their own legal
research preliminary to seeking federal re-
lief.'84 Such a holding, in the Court's thinking,
did not place federal courts in the position of
closely supervising the decisions of prison ad-
ministrators, since it had indicated an array of
possibilities from which selections might be
made to meet local needs. Nor did it matter
that states would incur financial obligations in
meeting sixth amendment-based demands.
The only legitimate scope for such concerns is
in selecting which of the permissible modes of
vindicating the sixth amendment will be used
in a given jurisdiction.
For the most part, however, the Court held
back in delineating the rights of prisoners un-
der the Constitution.'
8' In Estelle v. Gamble,
86
it entered quite gingerly into the sphere of
prisoners' claims to adequate medical treat-
ment. Using its capital punishment decisions
of an earlier era187 as the departure point, it
found that only deliberate indifference to seri-
ous medical needs constitutes "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the
eighth amendment. Accidental injury or inad-
vertent or negligent failure to provide adequate
treatment does not state an actionable claim
'84 The claim to legal assistance under Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), extends to preparation
for both habeas corpus and civil rights actions. Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
18I In Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976), the
Court found no obligation under Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), to hold a preliminary or
final parole revocation hearing upon the issuance of
a parole violation warrant when Moody was im-
prisoned under a later criminal conviction. As long
as confinement turned on something other than the
violation warrant, nothing was to be gained by a
hearing on the violation; in any event, paroling
authorities should have the benefit of Moody's insti-
tutional record, a factor which would be denied them
if an immediate revocation hearing had to be held.
A state court decision had the potential to offer
issues of parole granting procedures under due proc-
ess, but the matter was remanded for consideration
of the mootness issue when one petitioner died and
the other was paroled during pendency of the appeal.
Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
Dixon v. Love, 97 S. Ct. 1723 (1977), has some
potential implication for the prisoner litigation con-
text, in that it holds no preliminary hearing is re-
quired before an operator's permit can be suspended
through administrative action, based on convictions
for specified traffic offenses.
186 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
187 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.




under federal civil rights legislation. Since
Gamble's claim of neglected treatment
amounted at most to a medical malpractice
matter, it should have been litigated in state,
not federal, court.
Prisoners have but limited first amendment
rights, '18 8 as the opinion in Jones v. North Caro-
lina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. 1'9 starkly shows.
State prison authorities prevented union mem-
bers from sending bulk mailings into prisons
and from encouraging union membership
through conducting meetings and personal in-
terviews. This action was asserted to have in-
fringed the prisoners' first amendment rights.
In addition, the fact that outside organizations
like Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous were
allowed to meet with prisoners, while the union
was not, was asserted to deny equal protection
as an irrational classification. The Court
strongly disagreed.
Its beginning premise is that incarceration
produces curtailment of the right to associate
with persons in and out of prison. Moreover,
in support of the first premise, appropriate
deference is to be given to administrative deci-
sions intended to promote security and achieve-
ment of institutional goals. That being so, the
restrictions imposed by state correctional au-
thorities on bulk mailings and meetings were
justified, at least in the sense that those author-
ities were not "conclusively" shown to have
been mistaken in their evaluation of the threat
posed by union activities. Nor had those au-
thorities unreasonably discriminated in their
selection of outside organizations allowed to
conduct meetings for prisoners. Groups like
Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous aided in
efforts to prepare inmates for release into the
community, while the "avowed intent" of the
prisoners' union was to pit residents against
11 Censorship of prisoner correspondence is per-
missible only under restricted circumstances, because
the first amendment rights of those who correspond
with prisoners are also involved. Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Correspondence from coun-
sel, if clearly identified as such, may be opened in
the prisoner's presence and inspected for contra-
band, but not read, by prison authorities. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Media representa-
tives have no right to interview inmates of their
choice, but the Court intimated that it would reach
out at efforts to conceal prison conditions from the
media or general public. Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pel v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974).
189 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
administrators. Decisions reached according to
such criteria are not unreasonable by equal
protection standards.
In short, penal administration is hardly im-
mune from federal constitutional scrutiny. But
the Prisoners' Union decision, in particular,
serves notice on the federal judiciary that its
members cannot treat the recipients of correc-
tional attention as if they are members of the
general population. A substantial burden rests
on prisoner litigants to establish that constitu-
tional rights have been substantially impaired
by administrative action shown to be without




The Court's 1976 capital punishment deci-
sions'90 have an identifiable holding, namely,
that under some circumstances a discretionary
death penalty does not violate the eighth
amendment. It is difficult to project with con-
fidence a controlling rationale for the Court's
handling of this volatile issue because doctrinal
statements are by a plurality only. That prob-
lem continued during the 1976 Term in Coker
v. Georgia.191 The only doctrinal premise
acceded to by a majority of the Court is "that
the capital sentencing decision allow for consid-
eration of whatever mitigating circumstances
may be relevant to either the particular of-
fender or the particular offense."'192 In line
with this premise, the Court held that the
mandatory death penalty cannot be exacted
for murder of a law enforcement officer 93 or
rape of an adult woman.' 94 But the primary
concern of the Court's recent capital punish-
ment decisions is the procedure to be followed
before the death penalty can be imposed.
Such a rationale is illustrated by Dobbert v.
Florida,' 5 in which the Court ruled there to be
'90 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); see Skinner, supra note 2, at 371-72.
191 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
192 Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1977).
193 Id. The Court once more reserved the question
of whether such a penalty can be applied to life
prisoners who commit murder. Id. at 1996 n.5.
'N Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977). This
can be taken to leave open the question of the death
penalty if forcible rape of a child should be involved.
'95 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977).
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no ex post facto violation when, after the date
of the murder committed by Dobbert, the state
enacted the capital penalty provisions later sus-
tained in Proffitt.196 The procedures mandated
by the revised state legislation were more ben-
eficial to the defendant than those in the earlier
statutes, 197 thus eliminating that aspect of the
ex post facto doctrine. Although Furman had
seemingly outlawed capital punishment, Dob-
bert was on notice that as far as Florida was
concerned the offense was a capital one. There-
fore, a change in procedure which rendered
the death penalty an available sentencing alter-
native did not add a new substantive element
to the offense of which the defendant could
not have been aware at the time of the homi-
cide. Finally, there was no merit in Dobbert's
contention that a new provision forestalling
parole for a life convict earlier than twenty-five
years after conviction amounted to ex post
facto legislation. If Dobbert had been sen-
tenced to life imprisonment there might have
been a basis for him to object, but the death
sentence imposed on him rendered a limitation
on parole irrelevant as far as he was con-
cerned .198
One obvious consequence of Dobbert is that it
gives a form of retroactive effect to the 1976
decisions sustaining discretionary capital pun-
ishment under some circumstances. Beyond
this, however, the Court has also indicated, at
least in result, that the infliction of a mandatory
death sentence does not make a defendant
eligible for an automatic retrial. All that is
196 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The
homicide occurred after Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), which had ruled the death penalty
(under the particular legislation, in light of the 1976
rulings) to be cruel and unusual punishment.
197 The historic decision of Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386 (1798), includes "every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offence, in order to
convict the offender." Id. at 390.
I's Dobbert thus places a practical limitation on the
holding in Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397
(1936), in which a discretionary maximum at the
time of the commission of larceny was changed to a
mandatory penalty by the time of sentencing. The
impact of that change on Lindsey was obvious.
The Court also found no denial of equal protection
in the fact that after Furman the state supreme court
ordered all condemned prisoners to be resentenced
to life imprisonment, while Dobbert, sentenced after
the subsequent legislation, received no such reconsid-
eration.
required is a new sentencing procedure which
gives scope to the exercise of appropriate dis-
cretion. s9
Gardner also confirms the stress placed on
trial court proceedings in the course of which
the decision is reached whether or not to exe-
cute a given defendant. In that case, after a
jury had recommended a life sentence, the
trial court used the undisclosed contents of a
presentence report as a basis to assess the death
penalty. This, the Court ruled, denied due
process to the defendant. It found no merit in
the state's assertion that disclosure would dry
up confidential sources of information, unnec-
essarily delay proceedings, and interfere with
rehabilitation, as well as denigrate the ability of
state judges to exercise discretion in a respon-
sible manner. The need for a realistic oppor-
tunity for defendants to controvert factual data
in a presentence report, particularly one bear-
ing on the death penalty, overrode all these
considerations, assuming any had merit if in-
voked in a noncapital case. Gardner supersedes
the Court's earlier Williams200 decision as far as
capital cases are concerned. It also lends sup-
port to those who advocate full disclosure of
presentence reports in all but exceptional cases,
regardless of penalty, although of course it
constitutes no constitutional precedent outside
the death penalty context.
Revival of capital punishment in some set-
tings serves also to revive the rule precluding
automatic rejection of jury venire persons who
express scruples against the death penalty,201 a
conclusion attested to by Davis v. Georgia.
20 2
An oddity of the term was the Court's han-
dling of the Gilmore case. In efforts to override
Gilmore's unwillingness to contest the propriety
of his death sentence, his mother sought to
challenge the validity of his pending execution.
A majority of the Court thought that if the
person primarily concerned had competently
foregone the opportunity to contest the sen-
tence imposed, all other persons lacked interest
to litigate. 203 This of course is a straightforward
199 Gardner v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977). Ob-
viously, this has no application in a jurisdiction which
has not amended its legislation to provide for discre-
tion, as Dobbert allows.
21 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1948).
201 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1967).
2-0 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
20 Gilmore v. Utah, 97 S. Ct. 436 (1976). Gilmore's
execution in January, 1977 was the first to occur in
the United States in almost a decade.
(Vol. 68
FOREWORD
application of waiver rules, but it does create
at least a limited opportunity for what one
might call judicially approved suicide.
VII
SUBSTANTIVE CRMINAL LAW
The decisions discussed earlier under the
heading of allocation of the burden of persua-
sion2° have an important bearing on the fields
of criminal law out of which they arose. But
there are other rulings by the Court, principally
on constitutional grounds, which impact on the
law of crimes.
A. Sex Discrimination
Legislatures that wish to discriminate be-
tween the sexes in defining criminal conduct
bear the burden of establishing what one might
call a "bona fide occupational qualification"
205
for crime. In Craig v. Boren,2° a vendor of
alcoholic beverages attacked his conviction for
selling liquor to a male under age twenty-one,
on the basis that the statute penalized the sale
of alcoholic beverages to females only if they
were younger than eighteen. The state endea-
vored to justify the distinction by showing that
male drivers are involved in more vehicle acci-
dents because of intoxication than females. A
majority of the Court found this unpersuasive,
particularly when underage males who suc-
ceeded in purchasing alcoholic beverages un-
lawfully were not punishable for drinking
them. Prosecution efforts to use statistical anal-
ysis to support a sex-differentiated statutory
system were not persuasive to the Court, and
the legislative system fell under the impact of
the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause.
B. Bill of Attainder
The shock waves of Watergate continue to
create new jurisprudence .207 After former Pres-
ident Nixon left office, Congress by special
legislation 2 8 required him by name to surren-
der to the General Services Administration a
204 See text accompanying notes 142-149supra.
202 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a) (1976), dealing with discrimination under
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.
206 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
207 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(litigation over subpoenas for presidential tapes in
connection with Watergate prosecutions).
208 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1974).
vast number of documents and recordings.
These were to be screened by GAO archivists
who would return personal or private docu-
ments and retain the rest as historical docu-
ments. The statute represented a sharp depar-
ture from nearly two centuries of tradition
which viewed presidential papers as private
property, frequently sold by heirs for profit in
earlier generations but for the most part lodged
in university or other public libraries since the
turn of the century. Mr. Nixon attacked the
statute as facially void on several grounds,
209
but met with no success before the Supreme
Court.210
A doctrinally interesting branch of the attack
rested on the constitutional prohibition against
bills of attainder.211 The former president
maintained that because the statute named him
specifically and rested on the assumption that
he had participated in criminal activity which
would motivate him to conceal or destroy in-
criminating materials, the legislation amounted
to a prohibited bill of attainder. A majority of
the Court disagreed. Mr. Nixon was named
because he was the only former president
whose papers were not already in the custody
of a public library facility; therefore, he consti-
tuted "a legitimate class of one." '212 Nor was
the legislation enacted for a punitive purpose,
i.e., to aid in criminal investigation; rather, it
was designed to preserve materials of historical
significance and thus was not within the con-
cept of bills of attainder.
C. First Amendment Conflicts
(1) Regulation of obscene material. Judicial ef-
forts at drawing a workable line between those
sex-related materials which may be outlawed
and those which must be allowed to circulate
by virtue of the first amendment seem fore-
doomed to failure. The Supreme Court has
never been willing to accept the proposition
that freedom of speech extends to allow free
traffic in all materials, no matter how abhorrent
a substantial majority of the populace may find
209 See text accompanying note 29 supra, on the
general warrant aspects of the litigation.
210 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 97
S. Ct. 2777 (1977).
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
212 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 97
S. Ct. at 2805. By a process of reverse incorporation,
equal protection is part of the fifth amendment
where federal activity is concerned. See, e.g., Marshall
v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
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them to be. 21 At the other extreme, the Court
will not allow legislatures or prosecuting au-
thorities to bow to a vocal minority or even a
majority and prosecute those who deal in ma-
terials which such groups find objectionable.
14
But the attempt to shift backward and forward
the boundary between protected and pro-
hibited sexually-tinctured material, currently
represented by the Miller doctrine,'215 appears
to produce more constitutional litigation than
it forestalls.
One perhaps transient problem has been the
effective date of application of the Miller test
for obscenity. In Marks v. United States,"51 a
federal trial court applied the Miller definitions
to conduct which had occurred before the date
of that decision. This the Court viewed to be
an ex post facto application of a substantive
law standard more disadvantageous to the ac-
cused than the Roth-Memoirs"17 test. Therefore,
to the extent that Marks' conduct might have
been proscribed under Miller but allowed un-
der the earlier standard, it could not be reached
in a post-Miller prosecution, without infringing
upon the ex post facto provision .
21
Marks does not mean that state legislation
affecting activities before the Miller decision is
not possible. Changes in procedure, including
the content of jury instructions, can be accom-
plished as long as they do not ease the ultimate
burden of persuasion borne by the prosecu-
2" The closest approach to that position is perhaps
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), which held
that private citizens could not be penalized for pos-
session (at least not involving display to others) of
pornographic materials in their homes.
214 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
215 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Three
elements satisfy constitutional requirements under
Miller: (1) the work as a whole appeals to prurient
interest, judged by an "average person applying
contemporary community standards"; (2) the mate-
rial depicts or describes sexual conduct specifically
defined by state law, in a "patently offensive way";
and (3) the material as a whole lacks "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." See Smith v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 1756, 1763 (1977), summariz-
ing the Miller standard.
216 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977).
217 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1954).
"' The appropriate trial procedure would have
been to instruct the jury to acquit unless it found the
materials "utterly without redeeming social value,"
the Memoirs standard. Marks v. United States, 97 S.
Ct. at 995.
219 The same principle embodied in the capital
punishment decision of Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S. Ct.
tion. 2 9 In Splawn v. California, 2 0 the defend-
ant's 1971 conviction was reversed on the
strength of Miller. The basic criminal statute
remained unchanged throughout the Splawn
litigation, but between 1973 and the defendant's
retrial the state legislature provided for a "pan-
dering" instruction2 2 ' to guide juriei in decid-
ing whether material was utterly without re-
deeming social importance. Because state
courts had ruled that evidence of this sort had
been admissible before the statute, a conclusion
which the Supreme Court would not impeach,
there was no ex post facto result wrought in
instructing the jury according to statute in the
petitioner's post-Miller retrial.
In cases arising after Miller, states have at
least two options to bring their law into con-
formity with constitutional standards for ob-
scenity. One option is to amend or replace
earlier legislation with language which tracks
the Miller test. Statutes in such a form will
survive attacks based on a contention that they
are vague and indefinite. 22 The other option
is for courts to construe older legislation so as
to incorporate Miller standards. Carried to an
extreme, this process can contravene the con-
stitutional requirement that statutes give fair
warning of their coverage,"' but there seems a
fair degree of latitude in salvaging earlier leg-
islation through this avenue." 4 Indeed, a state
judiciary may extend by analogy the Miller
standard to cover material not precisely in-
volved in that and ensuing litigation. 22 The
2290 (1977), discussed in text accompanying notes
197-200 supra.
220 97 S. Ct. 1987 (1977).
211 On the basis of Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87 (1974) and Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966), "evidence of pandering to prurient
interests in the creation, promotion, or dissemination
of material is relevant in determining whether the
material is obscene." Splawn v. California, 97 S. Ct.
at 1990.
222 Splawn v. California, 97 S. Ct. 1987 (1977), and
Smith v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977), suggest
this to be a valid assumption.
222 Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
224 Ward v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2085 (1977).
221 In Ward the Court rejected a contention that
sadomasochistic material could not be comprehended
within the categories of materials set forth in Miller.
Cf. Ross v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (statute punish-
ing "crime against nature" could be extended
through judicial interpretation to include cunnilin-
gus, when state court had already included fellatio;
no infringement of constitutional fair warning re-
quirements).
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Supreme Court appears disinclined to convert
itself into a superlegislature to review the de-
tails of statutory language penalizing traffic in
obscene matter.
The Court clearly views federal obscenity
legislation as a body of law directed at achieving
a federal purpose (essentially undelineated),
and not something in aid of state law enforce-
ment. That, at any rate, seems to be the mes-
sage of Smith v. United States. 226 At the time
Smith was arrested for mailing, within Iowa,
material explicitly portraying adult homosexual
and heterosexual activity, Iowa law prohibited
only dissemination of such material to minors.
At trial Smith sought to inquire on voir dire
whether panelists knew contemporary stan-
dards relating to obscene matter in the federal
judicial district, the source of their knowledge
if any, and their understanding of the Iowa
law on the subject. The trial court refused to
allow such inquiries. During trial, the defend-
ant introduced similar publications available at
Des Moines adult bookstores, and the text of
the Iowa legislation. A defense motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal was denied, and
the jury convicted. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the conviction.
A principal contention by Smith was that the
community standard envisioned in Miller had
to be that of the state of the federal district.
Since the Iowa legislature at that time had not
proscribed the kind of matter in which Smith
dealt, and similar material was being purveyed
to adults without official state interference, his
position was that the subject matter of the
prosecution against him could not be consid-
ered prurient under contemporary community
standards. The Court disagreed. The Miller
test has been incorporated into a federal legis-
lative system 227 independent of any state's stat-
utes. A state or local legislative body does not
conclusively determine or freeze contemporary
community standards, no matter what the form
of the statutes or ordinances it enacts.22 8 Fed-
226 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
227 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United
States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
228 The Court notes that states can restrict the
coverage of their penal obscenity legislation to less
than the sphere of control allowed by Miller, set
geographical limits on the community to be used in
establishing community standards, promulgate jury
instructions on community standards, and utilize
zoning ordinances rather than criminal prosecutions
eral juries are to be allowed to implement their
own notions of community standards as long
as they do not abuse their factfinding discretion
in the process, 229 even if the results they reach
would not be acceptable under state jurispru-
dence.3 0 Nor, in the Court's thinking, would
this amount to nullification of local policy. Just
as the Court had allowed a ban on importation
of material which a successful recipient might
possess without legal hindrance,"2 so federal
postal authorities could bar either intrastate or
interstate postal shipments of matter left un-
regulated by local law. Federal law controls for
federal purposes. Despite this holding, one
may still wonder whether federal law enforce-
ment would not be best served by using federal
statutes to aid those states which wish to utilize
the Miller standards. In addition, federal goals
might be better served by returning wanted
persons who transmit forbidden material from
out-of-state havens, rather than by promoting
independent federal regulation of conduct not
at the moment of concern to local legislators.
(2) Advertising as protected speech. " 2 The Court
had already held that some forms of commer-
cial advertising or announcements are a form
of first amendment-protected speech.?2 In
to control local problems. Smith v. United States, 97
S. Ct. at 1764-65.
229 See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
2" The Court indicated it would be proper to let
federal juries know of the coverage of local law.
Smith v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 1767. However,
voir dire cannot go beyond ascertaining that jurors
can apply community standards objectively; it cannot
inquire into the venire persons' understanding of
the meaning of the standard, a meaning presumably
to be supplied by a trial court's instructions of law on
the point. Inquiry is proper if it is directed to "how
long a juror has been a member of the community,
how heavily the juror has been involved in the
community, and with what organizations having an
interest in the regulation of obscenity the juror has
been affiliated." Id.
221 The effect wrought, according to the Court, by
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973), on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
232 In Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977),
discussed in text accompanying notes 175-77 supra,
the Court struck down the ihvocation of a statute
penalizing the defacing or obstruction of motor ve-
hicle license plates against Jehovah's Witnesses who
covered a state slogan because they felt it to conflict
with their religious beliefs. In one sense the state
may have wished to circulate a motto, but could not
force citizens to do so against their personal beliefs.
2 Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona ,234 the
same principles were held to govern advertising
by attorneys. 2- s Consumers of legal services
have a claim to information about their availa-
bility, as long as it is not false, misleading or
deceptive. "[T]he flow of such information may
not be restrained ."236
Even a desire to prevent "block-busting," in
which whites flee a neighborhood when any
members of a minority ethnic group appear
(or are rumored to appear), by forbidding "for
sale" signs contravenes the first amendment
rights of owners and realtors to advertise that
premises are available .23 Under Virginia Phar-
macy Board, consumers had a claim to needed
information even though it was subject to pos-
sible misuse.2s
2' 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
23 No Sherman Act violation was found to exist,
however. Id. at 2698.
23 Id. at 2709.
231 Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 97 S. Ct.
1614 (1977).
238 The Court left open the possibility that a com-
munity might carry the burden of showing that some
form of restriction was justified for a time in order
to prevent panic selling. Id. at 1620.
An interesting, though collateral, first amendment
ruling is Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977), in which the Court held a
VIII
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion demonstrates the
wide-ranging problems with which the Court
dealt. Some of the 1976-1977 decisions confirm
the dedication of the Court to certain goals,
for example, restrictions upon the numbers of
state prisoners who seek federal relief. Many
may find those goals unappealing in compari-
son with those pursued by the Court in the
1960s. In certain other contexts, for example,
that of the fourth amendment, the Court seems
not to have abandoned its direction toward
granting more freedom of action for law en-
forcement. But there are enough aberrant dis-
cussions of doctrine in some of the Term's
cases that one can but await the Court's work
in the Term just commenced to see whether
the Court is simply pausing a while for breath,
rather than rethinking the propriety of some
of its doctrinal positions expressed since 1971.
television channel could be civilly liable to a per-
former (a "human cannon ball") when it telecast his
entire fifteen-second act at a time when he was
appearing within the broadcast territory. The anal-
ogy invoked was that of the broadcast of a copy-
righted work without the copyright owner's approval.
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